Whatever Chaudhry Nisar may say, the fact is that Benazir Bhutto’s “long march” has succeeded beyond anyone’s expectations, including hers. True, Bhutto’s courage and determination were exemplary and her jiyalas put up a dogged show. But if it hadn’t been for Nawaz Sharif’s massive overkill, the “long march” would never have caught the world’s headlines. If Islamabad looked like an occupied city on November 18, if the government seemed to be in a state of siege, if Sharif has boxed himself in, he has only himself to blame. Certain conclusions follow from the government’s reaction.
First, such a massive show of force suggests that Sharif was nervous and panicked. This is the response of a regime which is inherently brittle. Sharif’s overkill is based on three psychological factors: guilt, awe and fear. Sharif knows he is guilty of having rigged the 1990 elections and therefore lacks moral legitimacy. He is in awe of peoples’ power because he knows it is capable of overthrowing governments. Consequently, he greatly fears the Peoples Party which has always demonstrated considerable street clout.
Second, his government has progressively broken down. There are two symptoms of this breakdown: indecisiveness and resort to unpredictable violence by the organs of the state. Consider, for example, how Sharif’s confusion led Benazir Bhutto to seize the initiative on November 18th. Armed barricades were established outside Bhutto’s residence, presumably to deny her exit. But the police was actually clueless about what to do when she determined to walk through. In fact the violent riot which ensued, in which several people including Bhutto, Jatoi and Leghari, were attacked while she was making her get-away, was completely manufactured by the police. Then there was a mock chase. Even after she was picked up in Rawalpindi later in the evening, it wasn’t clear to the police whether they’d “arrested” her or not. A formal warrant wasn’t served until 1 am early next morning. In between, she was driven about aimlessly by a DSP for an hour or so until someone in the kitchen cabal thought she should be bundled off to Karachi. Frantic efforts were then made to put her on the 7 pm flight. When the police missed that flight, she was packed off to the State Guest House and then put on the night coach to Karachi. Banned from entering Rawalpindi, Islamabad and Peshawar the government is waiting for her to make the next move. Since she has resolved to continue her campaign, there is nothing the government can do except to eventually arrest her for good. And then what? No one in Islamabad has a clue.
There was no method in Islamabad’s madness. The same sort of stop-go tactics were used to sort out other “trouble-makers”. The police let some opposition leaders go, then arrested them and released some again. They have all been arrested again. Quite inexplicably, journalists and human rights activists were also rounded up or bruised (Miss Mariana Babar of The News had a tearful story to recount).
On the other side, Bhutto’s resolve has hardened. She has now formally upped the ante. The “long march” was initially billed as a peaceful and legitimate form of protest. Now she is saying it is nothing short of a “peoples rebellion” which aims to topple a “terrorist regime”.
This confrontation between “state power” and “peoples power” can only have two dangerous consequences. The transparent vulnerability of Nawaz Sharif’s government has cast a shadow on the stability of the political order. Pakistan’s history suggests that whenever state power in the hands of a civilian government is wayward, misguided or indiscriminate, as it is today, it is time for the military to think of flexing its muscle.
The other outcome has to do with the controversial limits of Presidential discretion. The violent confrontation between Sharif and Bhutto has made Ishaq Khan even more powerful. Where political stability demands that both protagonists should join hands to diminish the executive authority of the President, one has now completely put himself at the mercy of the 8th amendment while the other is actively encouraging recourse to it.
It won’t be easy for either of them to pull back from the brink. They have both burnt their boats by staking everything on the moment. Further, there is no transparency in their motives. Sharif strongly suspects she has got a nod from somewhere; Bhutto believes he means to disqualify her for seven years and hound her out of the country. Each is trying to lean on either the President or the COAS.
If the confrontation continues, even sporadically, on its reckless path, it is bound to breed public frustration with government. Sharif has therefore more to lose than Bhutto. His flagship of privatisation will flounder on the rock of instability and uncertainty. And, sooner rather than later, the public’s growing disenchantment with lawlessness, sectarianism, corruption and bungling will catch up on him.
Benazir Bhutto has been hounded to the wall. While some people find her tactics of toppling Nawaz Sharif unjustified, there are many more who say she was cornered and that is why her fightback is perfectly understandable. The ball is in Nawaz Sharif’s court.