General Pervez Musharraf’s domestic policies are more ‘forward’ looking than conservative, while his external policies are pro-US and pro-West. But public sentiment is staunchly conservative and anti-America. Yet, barring the extremists, there’s universal support for his views on “enlightened moderation”. Is there a mismatch between public policy and public opinion that might lead to instability in Pakistan?
The “mismatch” exists to the extent that two factors — anti-American outrage and pro-Islam sentiment – impinge on ground realities. But if we disaggregate or deconstruct each factor into its necessary and sufficient components, the “mismatch” between public policy and public opinion is not dangerously destabilizing.
There are two components of anti-Americanism in Pakistan. The first element is global-general. After the cold war, America was perceived as an unaccountable bully and anyone who said so evoked sympathy. From this flows the view that “America had it coming” on 9/11. This also explains a sneaking sympathy for Al-Qaeda that transcends religious sentiment. It brings together rightists and leftists, the secular and the sacred-minded. The second element is country-specific. Pakistanis were pro-America when America was a valued ally from 1947 to 1990 despite unjust or hegemonic American policies elsewhere. But Pakistanis became anti-America after America objected to Pakistan’s nuclear programme, sanctioned it for crossing the red light, denied it military hardware and sought a new strategic relationship with India. The net impact of America’s anti-Pakistan policies from 1990-2001 was reflected in a failing economy and weakened military establishment in Pakistan which exacerbated the nationalist backlash. Thus there was sustained anti-Americanism in public policy and public opinion during this period. It was also a time of political instability culminating in a coup.
But 9/11 changed the nature of the matrix. While the people’s global-general sentiment against America worsened, the country-specific nationalist sentiment changed in favour of America after Musharraf unfurled a pro-America foreign policy which led to a restoration of American economic and military assistance to Pakistan, a swift revival of the flagging economy and a rehabilitation of Pakistan in the international community. This pragmatic nationalist sentiment is articulated and calibrated by the national security establishment and the industrial, trading and professional classes. And despite opportunistic deviations and protests, it is effectively backed by the mainstream political party (PPP) that represent the other half of the “masses”. This makes it a powerful factor in limiting the negative fallout of any “mismatch” between public policy and public sentiment, guaranteeing political stability and policy sustainability in the longer term.
In this context, General Musharraf’s appeal for “enlightened moderation” fulfills two important requirements of the popular imagination: it enables Pakistanis to retain their religious faith, beliefs and identities in the face of modernity, westernization and capitalist globalisation; and it facilitates a beneficial separation of their apolitical religiousity from the anti-nationalist political extremism of Al-Qaeda and its supporters that hurts the interests of Pakistanis at home and abroad.
At any rate, the potentially destabilizing impact of any “mismatch” between public policy and public opinion should not be overrated in non-democratic cultures and semi-democratic societies in which elections are not the most critical element of public accountability and government policy is not terribly responsive to popular pressure. This is especially true in Pakistan in which civilian governments and public policies are liable to be held accountable to the national security military establishment instead of the public and where elections are manipulated by the military intelligence agencies to reflect their requirement for a change in public policies. This power devolves from “overdeveloped”, strong and self-conscious post-colonial state structures in relation to “underdeveloped” civil society institutions and weak political party processes.
Some people worry about the negative fallout of the situation in Balochistan, Sindh and in relation to the MMA and the PPP. But surely the infighting in Sindh or the anarchy in Balochistan can be moderated as long as it doesn’t undermine Musharraf’s writ. A change of face or Governor’s Rule can be envisaged if matters get out of hand. Thus discord within the ruling oligarchy may not necessarily translate into country instability.
It is understandable why General Musharraf chose to banish the PMLN and PPP, co-opted the PMLQ, allied with the MQM and pitted the MMA against the PPP. But one unintended consequence of this strategy was the burgeoning of the MMA without a sufficient decimation of the PPP by the PMLQ. This wasn’t thought problematic at the time because Musharraf was still gung ho about the Taliban in Afghanistan and the jihad in Kashmir, which necessitated good relations with the MMA. But 9/11 has about-turned those calculations. Now it is widely accepted that radical political Islam is not good for Pakistan’s health. Hence the necessity of the philosophy of enlightened moderation and the opening of a dialogue with the PPP as a future working partner in place of the discredited, wayward MMA.