BBC Four has recently produced a chilling docudrama titled “The Situation Room-April 2004”. It is about how the United States might respond in the event of a war between Pakistan and India that threatens to end in a nuclear holocaust. The events described in the film are fictional but the dangers discussed are very real.
The drama unfolds in a predictable manner. The Lashkar-e-Taiba assassinates the Indian defence minister in New Delhi. Outraged, India retaliates by ordering air strikes across the Line of Control in Azad Kashmir. Pakistan launches a counter attack. Soon both armies have crossed the international border and are engaged in a full-scale conventional war. However, before long, the weighty Indian forces are able to cut across and seize the Multan-Karachi road, threatening to besiege Karachi. Pakistan’s military machine is exhausted and the Pakistani president-chief of army staff picks up the phone and tells the American president that he will press the nuclear trigger unless Indian forces inside Pakistan halt in their tracks. The American president orders an emergency meeting of the National Security Council in the Situation Room of the White House that is used for crisis management.
BBC Four has directed the film in a novel fashion. First, the actors are all real and powerful political players who have been in crisis situations before. The US president in the film is played by Rick Inderfurth (former Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia), the secretary of state is played by Tom Pickering (former Assistant Secretary of State), the vice-president is Bob Oakley (former US ambassador to Pakistan), and so on. Everyone in it has been a key decision maker in the US administration at some time or the other. Second, it appears that there was no formal script for the film. The actor-players were given the “facts” of how the crisis developed and told to hammer out their candid responses before the camera on the basis of their experience and knowledge, as though in a real life crisis situation. The manner in which they lay out their options, no less than their conclusions, is stunning.
1. Since the US cannot possibly “take-out” all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons swiftly or with any degree of certainty, it will not even try to do so because that might actually trigger a Pakistani nuclear attack on India.
2. The US will lean on India to halt its march on Karachi by giving concrete assurances of “operational action” against Jehadi forces in Kashmir and Pakistan. Indeed, the US will make clear to India that it will compel Pakistan to satisfy Indian demands and concerns regarding cross border infiltration and guarantee to India that Pakistan will carry out the measures. However, should India still disregard American advice and promises and persist in its military option against Pakistan, the US will use military force against Indian forces in Pakistan in order to stop Pakistan from resorting to nuclear weapons. But it will also “break some things in Pakistan” in order to balance its action against the warring sides.
3. Having staved off nuclear war, the US will forcefully address the underlying causes of Indo-Pak conflict. It will force both sides to withdraw. It will compel Pakistan to erase the Jehad. And it will ask India to address the problem of Kashmir.
This is not an implausible scenario. We came pretty close to something like it in 1999 and then perhaps again in late 2001 or early 2002 when India claims it was “provoked” by Pakistan to mobilise forces for an all-out war with Pakistan. On both occasions, Pakistan is alleged to have made a veiled nuclear threat, nudging the Americans to intervene and pressurise India against the option. Certainly, in 2002, we know that under American pressure General Pervez Musharraf made a promise to halt the export of “terrorism” from Pakistan to any country in the world, including India. The recent exchange of statements by the then Indian army chief (who says that India was ready to launch “hot-pursuit” operations last January) and our own General Musharraf (who says he threatened an “unconventional” war in retaliation) confirms not only that the scenario in the Situation Room is real enough but that it could have an unprecedented ending too.
In fact, that is the one major problem of the script. We are told that the drama in the Situation Room is played out in the aftermath of successful American action against Iraq and North Korea which has demonstrated American power and the resolve to use it if necessary. But what if US policy turns out to be a failure in both situations? Indeed, what if the US resolve to use force against India in order to stop Pakistan from using nuclear weapons in the final analysis is lacking when the time comes?
The film closes on a frightening note: “At some point in the future, nuclear weapons will be used in the region”, concludes the American president matter-of-factly, “If we can do anything to stop that from happening we should give it our best shot.” But that is hardly reassuring. Thus there are lessons in this film for the flawed establishments of Pakistan and India.