Benazir Bhutto’s singular achievement during her recent trip to Washington lies in persuading President Bill Clinton to publicly admit that the Pressler amendment is both unworkable and unfair. Mr Clinton has now pledged to approach Congress for a revision in US law whereby the long drift in US-Pak relations can not only be halted but also reversed. How credible is this US change of heart? Will something concrete emerge from it in due course?
The American record, unfortunately, isn’t terribly good. Since 1990, the United States has resorted to various tricks and treats to try to cap and roll back Pakistan’s nuclear programme. In April 1990, for instance, the US propagated the view that renewed tensions between India and Pakistan over Kashmir had propelled both countries to the brink of war. This led to a flying visit to the sub-continent by Mr Robert Gates, who later became head of the CIA, aimed at reducing tensions between the two countries by initiating confidence-building and war-avoidance measures. Mr Robert Oakley, then US ambassador to Washington, exploited the situation to accuse Pakistan of “crossing the red light” by upgrading its nuclear programme. Accordingly, in September 1990, Washington invoked the Pressler amendment to cut off all economic and military assistance to Pakistan.
The facts, however, were otherwise. A report by the Henry Stimpson Center in Washington published late last year, drew upon the testimony of the principal American, Indian and Pakistan actors on the political, military and intelligence fronts and concluded that there was no discernible movement of military forces by either India or Pakistan at any time during the summer of 1990. Hence, the report implied, the chances of armed conflict between India and Pakistan were remote. This conclusion strengthens Pakistan’s repeated assertions that it did not “unfreeze” its nuclear programme in 1990 because it did not perceive any immediate military threat from India.
The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable: Washington drummed up a war scenario between India and Pakistan so that it could accuse Pakistan of crossing the nuclear red light in 1990 as a raison d’etre for the subsequent application of the Pressler amendment to pressurise Pakistan to cap its nuclear programme.
By the time Pressler sanctions were first applied to Pakistan in September 1990, Islamabad had already paid an installment or two towards the contracted purchase of 28 F-16 fighter aircraft. The logical course then should have been to stop further payments to Lockheed since the planes couldn’t be delivered to Pakistan as long as President George Bush wasn’t prepared to sign a waiver. But this didn’t happen. Instead, for the next three years, Islamabad continued to fork over installments of tens of millions of dollars to Lockheed while Washington stood by and nodded approval.
Once again, the conclusion is inescapable: Washington led Pakistan to believe that it should continue to make payments for its F-16s because a Presidential waiver to Pressler remained on the cards. It was only in 1993, after Pakistan had made full payment of US 658 million for 28 F-16s which Lockheed was now ready to deliver, that the US tightened the screws. Far from agreeing to give a waiver and releasing the F-16s, Washington was now ready to accuse Pakistan of being a “terrorist” state.
This US strategy plunged Pakistan into desperate straits. If it didn’t compromise on its nuclear programme, it not only stood to lose US$ 1.4 billion in hard cash, it would also face the threat of further sanctions as a “terrorist” state.
Ms Bhutto was prime minister of Pakistan when Mr Strobe Talbott, US deputy secretary of state, came to Pakistan in 1994. Having progressively led two Pakistani governments (Ms Bhutto’s in 1988-90 and Mr Nawaz Sharif’s in 1990-93) and two army chiefs (General Aslam Beg and General Asif Nawaz) into a classic Catch-22 situation, Washington was now ready to offer Islamabad a “one time waiver” to Pressler. The condition: Pakistan should cap its nuclear programme by allowing international inspections of its nuclear facilities. In other words, damned if we did and damned if we didn’t.
In their moment of reckoning, however, prime minister Benazir Bhutto, President Farooq Leghari and COAS General Abdul Waheed stood their ground. F-16s or no F-16s, there would be no deal with the United States, they told Mr Talbott, if it compromised Pakistan’s national security concerns. This message was forcefully conveyed to the Americans when General Waheed went to the US in March 1994. It was reaffirmed by President Leghari during his ‘private’ visit to the US a month later. And Ms Bhutto drummed it into Mr William Perry, US defence secretary, when he came to Pakistan earlier this year.
The die was now cast for Ms Bhutto’s trip to Washington in April. If President Clinton couldn’t offer a way out of this deadlock, there would be a severe anti-American backlash in Pakistan with potentially far-reaching implications.
It is to Ms Bhutto’s credit that before embarking on her trip to Washington she was able to create the necessary backdrop for a sympathetic hearing at the White House. When President Clinton pledged to seek a revision of the Pressler amendment “which had discriminated against a good friend of long standing”, he referred to Pakistan’s determined actions against drug trafficking and terrorism while praising its continuing commitments to international peacekeeping.
Washington has now taken the first steps towards removing inequities in US-Pak relations. But there is a long way to go before the US President’s words can match his deeds. Although President Clinton acknowledges the necessity of revising Pressler, there is still considerable resistance in the US state department and in both houses of Congress. The Indian and Israeli lobbies are also expected to get into high gear when proposals for Pressler’s revision are mooted between the US administration and Congress.
Mr Clinton has the reputation of someone who makes a lot of promises and commitments but rarely lives up to them in the face of pressure. In Pakistan’s case, this is a worrying factor. Will he push for changes in Pressler at a time when he is under fire from Congress on a number of pressing domestic issues? Or will he pass the buck again?
Time, too, is severely limited. The US presidential elections, in which Mr Clinton is running for a second term, are around the corner. If a decisive strategy to revise Pressler is not mounted and won in the next few months, chances are that Pakistani concerns will be put on a back burner next year when America will become obsessed with itself. In the event, there is also no guarantee that the next American administration will follow up on Mr Clinton’s pledge to Pakistan this year. That would lead to renewed cynicism and anger in Pakistan and put Ms Bhutto on the spot.
Benazir Bhutto was a front-page star in the United States. The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times and the Los Angeles Times — all solid establishment newspapers — received her arguments sympathetically. Leading Senators and Representatives went out of their way to lavish courtesies upon her. President Clinton extended his talk session with her. Mrs Clinton sought an unscheduled private chat. Leading members of the American administration and corporate America hosted Pakistan’s investment conferences. Private universities bestowed honours upon her. Such enormous goodwill for Ms Bhutto now needs to be translated into tangible benefits for Pakistan.
This can only be done if suitable follow-up strategies are quickly initiated in Washington after Congress returns to work later this month. A great deal of lobbying is now required to consolidate the gains made by Ms Bhutto. But that is only one side of the coin.
The other side reflects domestic conditionalities. If Karachi’s troubles continue to hit headlines abroad, if the victimisation of the opposition leads to a dilution of the national consensus, if the economy doesn’t pick up, if Islamic extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking rear their ugly heads again, then all the gains from Ms Bhutto’s US trip will evaporate.
It would be tragic if a worsening domestic situation were to end up tarnishing a vastly improved international environment. In order to avoid such a predicament, Ms Bhutto needs to move decisively and fairly on the domestic front so that her image abroad as a dynamic leader of Pakistan squares with perceptions at home.