Conventional wisdom says that a ‘troika’ has ruled this country since the exit of Gen Zia ul Haq. While the current President and PM derive their powers from the amended 1973 constitution, the Army Chief is de facto “arbiter of the last resort” by virtue of the law of “historical necessity”.
There is, of course, much evidence to support this view. Gen Aslam Beg was a hands-on COAS from day one, as Benazir Bhutto discovered to her discomfort. In early 1989, she tried to overthrow Nawaz Sharif in the Punjab. But a couple of ‘innocent’ sentences from Gen Beg (“nothing is going to happen”) to newsmen on the eve of the no-confidence motion sent the horses galloping back into Mr Sharif’s stables. Later, when Mr Sharif tried to trounce Bhutto, Gen Beg delivered the MQM to him. He refused to court-martial Brig Imtiaz and Maj Aamer. He refused to clean-up Sindh (“I won’t chase shadows”). He connived with President Ishaq to chuck Bhutto out after vetting his charge-sheet against her before his corps commanders. He didn’t even spare Mr Sharif after he became PM. Gen Beg publicly opposed the government’s Gulf policy and played footsie with the Peoples Party to destabilise the government shortly before he retired.
In contrast, the new army chief, Gen Asif Nawaz, has shown a marked reluctance to thrust his own opinions on the government. If anything, he has backed Islamabad to the hilt. For instance, after Jam Sadiq Ali’s death, President Ishaq ordered the army chief to ‘persuade’ the opposition to give Mr Muzaffar Shah a lease of life. Similarly, when Mr Sharif wanted to cosy up to the United States, Gen Asif Nawaz reassured Washington that Pakistan’s nuclear programme would fall in line behind the PM’s five-nation proposals for non-proliferation in South Asia. The same is true for Mr Sharif’s Afghan policy — the army has abandoned any ambitions of conquering Kabul for the “strategic defence” of Pakistan.
Of course, nothing illustrates this point better than the army’s operation to clean-up Sindh. At every point, Gen Asif Nawaz has balked at taking decision-making out of the hands of the civilian government. He didn’t quibble too much when, after much prevarication, the government gave the army legal protection under section 147 of the constitution rather than section 245 which his predecessor had demanded. Similarly, the army has thus far stayed its hand in arresting top supporters of Mr Muzaffar Shah’s government in Sindh.
Unfortunately, however, the civilian players have been true to form. Islamabad has all but ignored the army’s pleas for an even-handed operation against all law-breakers in Sindh. Because the army’s credibility is on the line, it is relevant to ask how long this civilian charade will endure. For how long will the army chief restrain his generals from demanding greater freedom in hauling up criminals in the province?
Time may be running out. The third member of the troika could get impatient. His generals are pressing him to move ahead at full throttle, clean up efficiently and get out before the quicksand envelops the army. Alternatively, they say, if Islamabad is adamant in having its way, let’s pull out now and leave the civilians to handle the mess: “Why should we play Russian roulette, put a gun to our head and risk a loaded chamber?”
This is a valid question. Why, indeed, should the army stake its reputation on the bankrupt policies of a stubborn President and corrupt Prime Minister who have lost all moral authority to govern the country?
The answers may be already at hand. One option in Sindh is Governor’s Rule. The idea would be to dissolve all assemblies and local bodies and order fresh elections in six months time. In the meanwhile, both the PPP and the MQM would be given a good scrubbing and prodded to settle on a modus operandi in Sindh. Then what? Optimists would like to believe that the domino theory would come into play, with Islamabad falling squarely in the eye of the gathering storm. But is this likely to happen?
Much depends on how the two civilian members of the troika perceive the thinking in the army. If Islamabad is convinced that Gen Asif Nawaz doesn’t have the ace of spades to play as a card of the last resort — martial law — the President may decide to ride roughshod over the army’s concerns. Some people think the army wouldn’t take such a step because world opinion led by the Americans would condemn it roundly. Does that, therefore, mean that the “theory of the troika” doesn’t work any more in the changed circumstances?
It would be foolish to think so. The “law of historical necessity” coupled with Gen Aslam Beg’s legacy is not about to be washed away in a hurry. A few appropriate ‘signals’ from GHQ to Bhutto or to Junejo, or some plain talking to the President, could achieve a great deal without having to play the ace of spades. That Gen Asif Nawaz hasn’t resorted to such tactics, despite provocation, is a tribute to his professionalism. Islamabad shouldn’t push the third force into desperation. It could, more profitably, concede a third solution instead.