A year ago, India was solidly behind the CTBT. Now it is adamantly opposed to it. Until recently, Pakistan’s position was also clear. Now there appears to be much confusion about the issue. What has prompted a change of heart in both countries?
India’s new objections seem “principled” enough. The preamble to the draft CTBT stresses “the need for continued systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons…” Why, asks India, are the nuclear-haves not prepared to consider a time-table, however far-off, to eliminate their nuclear arsenals? Why are they not prepared to explicitly ban all nuclear testing down to “zero-yield”?
In fact, however, India opposes the CTBT for two significant reasons. India has nuclear ambitions — despite a crude test explosion in 1974, New Delhi needs refined testing to make its advanced missile delivery programme operational. Also, weak ‘secular’, ‘socialist’ governments at the centre must contend with threats to their power base from ultra-nationalist, ‘fundamentalist’ forces in favour of a Hindu bomb.
The rethink in certain Pakistani quarters is also understandable. It is suspected that India is holding back in order to secure some special concessions from the West (the promise of a seat in the UN Security Council or the availability of advanced computer technology to simulate nuclear explosions). Why, then, shouldn’t Pakistan also drive a hard bargain to secure some concessions?
Unlike India, however, the Pakistan government’s formal position on the CTBT still seems at odds with important sections of institutional and public opinion in the country. The prime minister has recently reiterated that Pakistan will sign the CTBT only when India does so. Certain sections of the Foreign Office, however, are thought to be keen on a different line: like China, they argue, we should sign the CTBT irrespective of what India does (since signing is only a “symbolic” gesture); but unlike China, they say, we shouldn’t ratify the entry-into-force provisions until we are able to negotiate special concessions from the G-7.
A new found, “hard-line”, approach on the CTBT is also in the throes of being adopted by anti-West fundamentalist parties as well as mainstream opposition parties. This posits a number of “pre-conditions”, including a plebiscite on Kashmir, which must be satisfied before Pakistan signs the CTBT. This is, in effect, a flat refusal to sign in the foreseeable future.
Finally, there is a brief, enigmatic statement allegedly made by the army chief in which he is supposed to have alluded to the desirability of rethinking the implications of a policy in which Pakistan is committed to signing the CTBT if and when India does so. If true, this would suggest that Pakistan’s “national security establishment” no longer approves of the oft-stated position on this issue by all civilian governments.
While confusion remains supreme in Pakistan, the rest of the world is moving swiftly to conclude the CTBT by end-September. China fell in line after its proposal to amend the draft CTBT was accepted some days ago (the decision to approve on-site inspection, in the event of a suspected nuclear test, shall now be made by 30 out of 51 members instead of 26). China, it is reported, also wants Pakistan to follow its example rather than that of India.
New Delhi, however, remains unmoved. Far from agreeing to sign the CTBT unless its objections are met by the G-7, it is threatening to veto any move to transport the CTBT draft to the UN General Assembly for approval. Its argument is that even if it refrains from signing the CTBT and abstains from voting in the UN, approval by an overwhelming majority of the members of the UN General Assembly could eventually bind countries, under acceptable canons of international law, to abide by the CTBT even though they may not have signed the treaty.
Pakistan, in the meanwhile, seems content to hide behind Indian skirts. It would doubtless heave a sigh of relief if India vetoed the draft at Geneva. But if India doesn’t exercise its veto, does Pakistan know what to do? Should it veto the CTBT at Geneva and risk worldwide censure? Or should it tag along with India all the way to New York and pray that New Delhi doesn’t sign the CTBT so that Pakistan can avoid having to take any difficult decisions?
Islamabad urgently needs to do some homework. As China has recently proved, the draft CTBT can also be amended to satisfy the national security requirements of the three ‘threshold’ powers. A close look is therefore required at those provisions which relate to entry-into-force, international monitoring systems and withdrawal from the treaty, all of which are currently designed in the interests of the Big-5. At the same time, Pakistan’s stance needs to be based on a domestic consensus which reflects realistic long-term national interests rather than emotional reaction against the West or blind surrender to India. If we don’t do this, a much more far-reaching treaty than the CTBT — the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty — will impose an unbearable strain on us next year.