Last month, the US deputy defense secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, reportedly made some critical remarks about Pakistan’s unwillingness or inability to flush out Al-Qaeda and Taliban elements from its tribal borderlands in aid of American objectives in the region. Predictably, Islamabad reacted with a howl of protest. Our foreign minister, Khurshid Kasuri, thundered that the Pakistan government was already doing more than what could legitimately be expected of it and claimed that several prominent American and world leaders had lauded Pakistan’s crucial support in the matter under trying domestic conditions. Mr Kasuri also reminded critics that specific American weapons promised to Pakistan for use in anti-Taliban/al-Qaeda operations, like helicopters, night-vision equipment, etc, had not yet materialised, making such operations very costly for Pakistan’s security forces. In the event, Mr Wolfowitz was compelled to backpedal a bit, saying that while he greatly appreciated Pakistan’s help, he nevertheless thought that Islamabad could “do more” to assist the American military in blasting the Taliban/Al-Qaeda out of their hiding places.
Now we have the American ambassador to Kabul, Zalmay Khalilzad, treading in Mr Wolfowitz’s footsteps. Mr Khalizad is reported to have said at the National Press Club in Washington last Monday that US-led forces in Afghanistan would move into Pakistani territory to destroy Taliban and other terrorist groups if Islamabad could not do the job itself. “We have told the Pakistani leadership that either they must solve this problem, or we will have to do it ourselves”, he said. As expected, his statement has provoked a sharp response from Islamabad, compelling him not only to distance himself from his position of a day earlier but also to praise Pakistan for the “sacrifices” it has made in fighting terrorism. But his bottom line even after the retraction remains the same as Mr Wolfowitz’s: Pakistan must “do more” to earn American gratitude.
It is much the same approach on other issues. In public, the US and the international community are all praise for General Pervez Musharraf’s efforts in the war against terrorism. But in private, senior American and EU officials seriously question General Musharraf’s “willingness or ability or sincerity” to do the job to their satisfaction. Similarly, the official international position on General Musharraf’s handling of “L’affaire Dr A Q Khan” is that it is satisfied with Pakistani assurances of full cooperation in uprooting the nuclear underworld network. But the unofficial position is quite different. The US and the international community actually believe that the high command of the Pakistan army is as guilty of proliferation as Dr Khan; that it cannot be trusted to keep its word in the future; and that at a more propitious time the issue will have to be tackled head-on with Pakistan. In other words, Pakistan will have to “do more” to stay off the hook. All this is perfectly understandable: President Bush needs credible and visible victories against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban this year to shore up his report card in the race for the American presidency next November.
In exchange for Pakistani assistance in these matters, Washington has already offered a fair price – help in obtaining soft financial support from donor agencies, US $ 1b in US debt write-off and US $ 3b in economic and military grants over the next five years. Now Pakistan has been granted Major Non-Nato Ally status, bringing it theoretically at par with countries like Israel and Egypt and enabling it to receive American military weapons and spares. But the small print in these contracts should not be missed: the MNNA status and US $ 600m per year grants are conditional on presidential certification every year, which in turn will doubtless depend on how much “more” Pakistan is going to do in the years ahead on these issues on behalf of the American foreign and domestic policy agenda.
Under the circumstances, at the very least we may expect the going for Pakistan and General Musharraf to get decidedly tougher next year. For one, if President Bush is re-elected, the pressure on him to deliver on the al-Qaeda and Afghanistan fronts will be considerably reduced. On the other hand, the pressure on him to take a tough line on nuclear proliferation might be increased. All this might make him less receptive to General Musharraf’s predicaments and diminish his “need” of Pakistan. Two, if Mr George W Bush isn’t re-elected, the next American president will be a Democrat who, like all previous Democratic American presidents, will be disinclined to take as sympathetic or helpful a view of Pakistan as Republican presidents have historically taken.
Pakistani leaders love to hold forth about Pakistan’s “geo-strategic position” which is supposed to make it a long-term American ally in the region. But they conveniently forget that before 9/11 Pakistan was on the radar screen in the West only as a potential rogue and failing state. Therefore it is not inconceivable that if we don’t get our act in order and clean up our house we could be back in dire straits again. That is why the title of the forthcoming book on Pakistan by Steve Cohen of the prestigious Brookings Institution in Washington DC may probably be titled: Pakistan – troubled or troubling state!