On 17 July, Benazir Bhutto said the PDA was ready to cooperate with President Ishaq if he dissolved the assemblies, formed a government of national consensus and held elections under an independent election commission. The PDA resolution, however, took a different position. “There is no other course for the nation but to force President Ishaq’s resignation”, it said, while demanding the trial of the President on charges of treason for supporting a terrorist and separatist organisation like the MQM. The PDA also announced its intention to resign en masse from the assemblies after launching a movement to get rid of the government.
That there is a contradiction in the positions taken by the PDA is obvious. On the one hand it says it is prepared to work with President Ishaq if he agrees to its demands. On the other, Bhutto is saying that “the situation has already reached a stage from which there can be no escape from the ‘inevitable'” because President Ishaq “is a usurper” who must be ousted. If President Ishaq is a treasonable usurper, why then is the PDA ready to cooperate with him on certain conditions?
The PDA is being foolish and opportunistic. When it accuses the President of everything under the sun and warns of the “inevitable”, what is it trying to achieve? The President can be impeached or removed by martial law. There is no other way of sending him home. Since impeachment is out of the question, is the PDA fingering the armed forces to boot him out?
For the sake of argument, let us be charitable to the PDA. Let us assume that Bhutto’s intention is simply to bring so much pressure to bear on the President that he is forced to dismiss the assemblies. What then? Will the PDA accept an interim government and election commission constituted by the President? “Only”, says Bhutto, “if they are both genuinely neutral”. But going by President Ishaq’s record in 1990, is that likely to happen? What if the PDA should find his arrangements unacceptable? Will the PDA then launch a movement to have the President removed through martial law? Even if we assume that President Ishaq can be prodded to dismiss the assemblies and hold genuinely fair elections, what will the PPP do if it doesn’t get a majority? Will it revert to accusations of “rigging” and demand the whole scenario all over again? And if the PPP wins, will it be prepared to forget all the bad blood between Bhutto and President Ishaq and hope to start on a clean slate again? Clearly, the PDA’s formal position is a non-starter.
So what exactly is the PDA playing at? Hints of “inevitability” suggest that Bhutto might, after all, be comfortable living with a short martial law which dispenses with President Ishaq and PM Nawaz Sharif, knocks out the MQM, rages against sectarian parties and religious fundamentalists, addresses the law and order situation and puts Pakistan on the rails again before calling for fresh elections and handing over the country to Bhutto.
This is a dangerously tall order. Even if (and it’s a big ‘if’) the armed forces had the will and ability to fulfil it in part, there is no reason to believe that, having sorted out the problems of Pakistan and collected kudos for it, the Generals would be disposed to hand over power to Bhutto on a silver platter. Having squandered a marvellous opportunity in 1988, Ms Bhutto is hardly likely to be given exclusive charge of the country again in the future.
In many ways we are back to the 1980s when President Zia was immovable, Bhutto was irresistible and it was left to fate to open up political space. But fate is a fickle mistress, so it is up to the politicians to find an answer to the mess they have created.
One way out is to broker a deal among the power- players, as in 1988. The President should dismiss the discredited assemblies, forge an acceptable interim government of ‘clean’ politicians who will not be eligible for elections which should be held within six months under the joint supervision of a revitalised election commission and the armed forces. Mr Ishaq Khan should also announce his intention not to contest for the Presidency in 1993. Whoever forms a government in Islamabad should join hands with the opposition to amend the constitution to get rid of the 8th amendment while simultaneously legalising the existence of a supra-body composed of the Prime Minister, Defence Minister, Interior Minister, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chief Ministers of the four provinces, the heads of the armed forces and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee. Call this watchdog what you will but give it some teeth and for the sake of form get the President to chair it (in the absence of the 8th amendment it shouldn’t matter who the President is).
If, at the end of all this, we are still unable to address the problems of democracy, power-sharing, national identity and economic backwardness, we don’t deserve this God-given country.