The ruling establishments of America and Pakistan have rediscovered a long lost “strategic relationship”. The core of this strategic relationship is supposedly represented by a mutuality of interests relating to the war against the Al-Qaeda-Taliban network in Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the reality is more complex.
From the American establishment’s point of view, two factors are important: Afghanistan must not ever become a base area for the export of Al-Qaeda inspired terrorism against America; and Pakistan must not become a breeding ground for radical Islam that feeds into Al-Qaeda.
The first requires the physical elimination of Al-Qaeda and its local Taliban allies from the region and the installation and consolidation of an Afghan regime in Kabul that is able to sustain a pro-US and anti-Al-Qaeda stance without the presence of American troops on the ground. The second requires pumping a lot of money into Pakistan’s economy and new weapons into Pakistan’s military – the first to make sure that mass poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and alienation do not breed desperate “Islamic” warriors who hate America and want to redress “root causes of global injustice”, as in Palestine and Kashmir; and the second to equip and spur the Pakistan’s army to go after the Al-Qaeda-Taliban network.
From the Pakistani establishment’s point of view, two factors are also important: America must install a regime in Kabul that is not just able to look after America’s interests but is also “friendly” or pro-Pakistan; and America must not do anything to disturb the civil-military imbalance in Pakistan that accounts for the preponderant role for the military in domestic, foreign and economic policy.
The first requires two elements: the proposed Afghan regime must be dominated by Pakhtuns who are friendly towards Pakistan; and the role of India in any future political dispensation in Afghanistan must be strictly limited to the social sector, leaving the administrative structure and apparatus of law, order and defense in the hands of Pakistan-friendly actors and players. The second entails a clear commitment by Washington not to try and pull civilian strings in Pakistan’s fledgling party-political system to influence, much less to dominate, Pakistan’s military establishment.
The record thus far shows that Pakistan’s military establishment has had the upper hand. After a decade of struggling against the Al-Qaeda-Taliban network and denying or even trying to negate the “Pakistan factor” in Afghanistan, the US seems to have finally conceded a “strategic” partnership role to Pakistan. Instead of talk of “do more” – as under COAS General Pervez Musharraf there is a sustained chorus of “well done” under COAS General Ashfaq Kayani. Indeed, recognition of this fact has pushed President Hamid Karzai to start negotiations with the Taliban, including sections close to the Pakistani establishment. The US also seems to have conceded Pakistan’s view that India must be nudged to make up with Pakistan rather than threaten it as it has done since Mumbai if American interests in Afghanistan are not to be jeopardized by a flare-up in India-Pakistan relations on any one of several simmering counts. Finally, and despite the pro-democracy rhetoric, the Obama administration is talking and dealing directly with the Pakistani brass, as the Americans did in the 1960s, 1980s and 2000s under three military rulers. The fact that General Kayani oversaw the “strategic dialogue” in Washington should not be lost on anyone.
This analysis has several short-term implications. First, as the deadline for Congressional elections draws nearer, the Obama administration may become desperately dependent on the Pakistani military establishment to give it a half-face saving exit strategy. This means that if, in the short term, politics in Pakistan takes a topsy-turvy spin that provokes the army, the Americans are going to tilt in favour of the military establishment. Second, much the same sort of sentiment is likely to prevail in Washington if there is a short and sharp conflict between India and Pakistan. Third, US military aid (money and weapons) is going to get pumped into the Pakistani system faster than economic assistance because the first is for quick fixes while the second is part of longer term stabilization policies.
This suggests that the US-Pakistan relationship today is actually “tactical” from America’s point of view and “strategic” from Pakistan’s. During the Cold War until 1989, it was “strategic” for both countries. The US “needed” Pakistan as a “front line” state against communism and Pakistan “needed” the US as a “back-up” state against India. Today, Pakistan’s need of America is unchanged – General Kayani has said that Pakistan will remain “India-centric” and require “soft strategic depth in Afghanistan” as long as India’s military capacity outreaches Pakistan’s, which is going to be forever. But America’s need of Pakistan, after abandoning “nation-building” in Afghanistan, may not last beyond the Obama administration’s electoral strategy. Indeed, the “war against Al-Qaeda terror” seems to be already shifting from the tribal areas of Pakistan to the badlands of Yemen.
Pakistan’s politicians dream of milking the US-Pakistan “strategic relationship” for tens of billions of dollars under another Marshall Plan. They also want nuclear parity with India. Under the circumstances, however, with the global capitalist economy in recession and fears of a nuclear threat from terrorists, Pakistan has as much chance of getting either as a snowball in hell.