After three “comfortable” years at the crease, General Pervez Musharraf has handed over the bat to Mr Zafarullah Jamali. In the event, it is only natural that he should wish to tally his score while making sure that Mr Jamali is able to build on it. How did General Musharraf fare?
Ruling by decree is always less “problematic” than ruling by consensus. That is why General Musharraf had few difficulties promulgating nearly 300 Ordinances in three years. But the true measure of a leader or government doesn’t lie in any such dubious records. Nor is it incumbent on the ease or difficulty with which he or she is able to survive in a dictatorial dispensation. It is, in fact, measured by two yardsticks: the courage and efficiency with which hard but necessary economic choices are mediated and institutionalised in a longer term perspective of national power; and the ability and willingness to ground such economic restructuring in a stable and democratic political framework that is conducive with the broad aspirations of the people.
The Musharraf regime has heaped laurels upon itself by a favourable comparison of various economic statistics before it took power in 1999 and after it relinquished it in 2002. This exercise certainly has propaganda value. For instance, it is heartening to be told that the SBP’s forex reserves were barely equivalent to one month’s import bill in October 1999 but have now burgeoned to account for ten months of imports. Remittances have also ballooned nearly three times since 1999. But it is not terribly enlightening to flog such figures without putting them in a proper context. Much of the good news is a consequence of an unplanned political somersault by the military regime last year as a result of 9/11 which led to an unprecedented economic bailout of Pakistan by a grateful international community rather than any intended or direct result of economic planning at home. Indeed, if that hadn’t been the case, the one true barometer of the economy – the exchange rate – wouldn’t have depreciated from Rs 54:1US$ in late 1999 to Rs 68:1US$ in late 2001 before climbing back to Rs 58:1US$ in the last twelve months. Nor should it be necessary to point to short term “achievements” like these when, by its own admission, the Musharraf regime is only really concerned about the long-term nature of its reform programme and is exhorting people to bear with it until it delivers fruit.
Indeed, the true economic achievements of this regime are quite laudable by any standards. Certainly, the broad parameters of absolutely necessary economic restructuring in the last three years are writ large. The State Bank is more autonomous and efficient and transparent today than ever before. That is a great achievement. The Securities and Exchange Commission is setting new standards in establishing and enforcing its regulatory writ. That is a most critical development for strengthening the market economy. The ongoing reform of the banking structure, including a rationalisation of the loan portfolio, is noteworthy. The attempt to rationalise the tax structure and reform the CBR, however insufficient, is a step in the right direction. WAPDA’s ability to get private power producers to reduce the rate at which they sell power to the government has appreciably reduced the long-term burden on the exchequer. The opening up of the telecommunications sector to private initiative, however lumbered, is the need of the hour. The pruning of Pak Railways, however painful, was long overdue. And so on.
It is on the political front, however, that General Musharraf’s record is bad. Forget about the “over-killed” referendum. Or the much-flaunted local empowerment system that is already being downgraded. These things don’t much matter to the economy. What matters is the development of a stable democratic system which enjoys broad domestic and international legitimacy so that the good economic reforms initiated three years ago can find root in it and be institutionalised. And it is on this score that the greatest doubts persist.
General Musharraf’s “boys” have been instructed to prop up the PML(Q) by hook or by crook to the exclusion of other deserving contenders for sharing power. For instance, the PPP has got more votes than any party in the country, yet it has been kept out of the loop This is a repeat of past military follies that first led to the creation of the MQM, then the Nawaz League and later the Haqiqis, all of whom began as being part of the military’s solution and ended up as being part of the country’s problem. The religious parties, too, were originally part of the MMA (Military-Mullah Alliance) solution. Today they are part of the problem. This approach won’t work because it leads to a dead end. The need of the hour is to incorporate all the elements of national power, including the mainstream political parties and their leaders, into a coherent and workable whole in the long term rather than to dissipate them at the altar of political expediency in the short run as in the past.
General Pervez Musharraf’s economic reforms are worthy. His political opportunism is not. A sound economic base cannot be sustained by such a wobbly superstructure. What a pity.