Two major developments of last week are noteworthy. The country was suddenly swamped by rumours about President Pervez Musharraf’s impending exit in days rather than weeks. And the PPP issued a draft constitutional amendment package for solving the issue of the judges and reducing the powers of the president. Both are linked and have a bearing on the political situation.
The “news” about President Musharraf’s exit was based on three factors: Mr Asif Zardari’s unexpected broadside at Mr Musharraf as a “relic of the past” who could be impeached, suggesting that the working relationship between the two had finally foundered; a late night, three hour meeting, between President Musharraf and COAS General Pervez Kayani, suggesting several prickly issues were discussed and sorted out on an “emergent” footing; and an abrupt change in command of the coup-making 111 Brigade in Pindi headed by a Musharraf loyalist, suggesting that the COAS was entrenching himself at the cost of his former boss and benefactor.
Mr Zardari’s anti-Musharraf comments came immediately after all the cases against him were formally dropped on the basis of the NRO and before he unveiled his constitutional package. This means Mr Zardari waited for irrevocable immunity before he leaned on President Musharraf via the constitutional package to relinquish his powers upon pain of impeachment. Critically, the weakening and eventual ouster of President Musharraf is an integral part of Mr Zardari’s “secret deal” with Mr Nawaz Sharif in exchange for restoring Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry as chief justice of Pakistan and then weakening and easing him from power too.
This must have unhinged President Musharraf. As per the original pre-election “understanding” between President Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto mediated by the Americans, President Musharraf’s power-status was to remain broadly unchanged after cobbling power-sharing governments in the centre and provinces between the PPP and PMLQ. But in Mr Zardari’s new formulation based on an outright PPP victory and rout of the President’s PMLQ in the last elections, the president was now being asked to sign away all his powers and become a lame duck prior to being kicked out by the PPP-PMLN coalition. If he refused to play ball with Mr Zardari, President Musharraf knew he had only two options. He could face either impeachment proceedings (an embarrassment but not a credible threat since the parliamentary numbers are missing for it) and contend with the restoration of the old judges via an executive order, which would have amounted to a veritable death sentence on his presidential election last November. Or resign in a huff and fly off to safety. In the event, however, neither of the two options might have suited the COAS. In the first, General Kayani might have had to intervene if the current Chief Justice of Pakistan or President Musharraf had ordered the army to defend the SC against a physical takeover by the old judges backed by an executive order. That would have meant defying the writ of the government of the day which is backed by parliament and opposition, a very precipitous course of action. But not doing so would have meant condoning the disgraceful ouster of a former army chief and boss, an unpalatable proposition. So the meeting between General Kayani and President Musharraf must have concentrated on weighing the options and finding a workable solution. What might that be?
Three developments since that fateful Thursday suggest a possible “compromise” among the key players in time to come. First, Mr Zardari has seemingly backtracked for the time being. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani has said his government will continue to work with President Musharraf; information minister Sherry Rehman has said the PPP has not discussed impeachment of the president with the PMLN; and Mr Zardari has said he is still opposed to any restoration of the judges via an executive order. Second, President Bush has weighed in with support for President Musharraf. Third, the army has sent a firm message to the media to stop flying kites. This means that getting rid of President Musharraf through an executive order restoring the judges or even attempting to impeach him is not an option for Mr Zardari. Apart from putting Gen Kayani in a difficult position, it would lead to a stampede of PMLQ into the arms of the PMLN, upset the numbers game in Punjab and Islamabad and threaten Mr Zardari’s primacy in power. Equally, it means that retaining all his current powers and serving out his full term is not an option for President Musharraf. He has to go sooner rather than later.
This is where the constitutional amendment package impinges on the situation. In the final analysis, Mr Sharif will have to give in to Mr Zardari on the judges’ issue and Mr Musharraf will have to give in to Mr Zardari on the scope of his powers and timing of his exit. Indeed, the constitutional package (and therefore the judges’ restoration) can only be clinched if President Musharraf’s Kings Party supports it. How soon an “honourable” way out for President Musharraf can be found on the basis of an “understanding” between the PMLQ and PPP remains to be seen.