After six days of intense, often bitter, talks, an Afghan peace accord sponsored by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran was signed in Islamabad on Sunday 7th March by leaders of eight major Afghan parties. Later, accompanied by Mr Nawaz Sharif, everyone flew off to Saudi Arabia for the holy blessings of Shah Fahd. On the way back, they will stop over in Teheran for a pat on the back from the Iranians. The accord allows President Burhanuddin Rabbani (Jamaat i Islami) to remain in office for 18 months (after the date of becoming President in December 1992) while Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hizbe Islami) becomes Prime Minister. It envisages the formation of a cabinet and a Defence Council (DC) by Mr Hekmatyar “in consultation with the President and all the leaders of the Afghan parties” within two weeks. Each Afghan signatory will offer one nominee for the cabinet and two for the DC to whom the defence minister will be subservient. All the militias in Kabul will be merged into a national army to which they will hand over their armour. This army will be under the command of the DC which will ensure that roads and communications are kept open at all times and that state funds are not misused by private militias. Elections will follow the establishment of an “independent election commission approved by all parties”. A Constituent Assembly will be elected within 8 months to formulate a Constitution under which another round of general elections will be held before June 28th 1994 when President Rabbani’s term expires. All prisoners held by different groups will be released immediately. An all-party committee shall supervise the monetary system and a joint Organisation of Islamic Conference-Afghan commission shall monitor the peace. Where so many Afghan peace accords have failed in the past, why should this one succeed, especially when there are many gaping holes in it? General Rashid Dostum, the powerful Uzbek militia leader who controls north-west Afghanistan, did not attend the parleys, so presumably he is not bound by the agreement. Nor did commander Ahmad Shah Masoud, President Rabbani’s fiercely independent defence minister, who occupies Kabul (and north-eastern Afghanistan) and is bitterly opposed to giving up his powerful portfolio. Even as the accord was being signed in Islamabad, Masoud’s forces shelled Hekmatyar’s positions in the south of Kabul for two days running. Later, President Rabbani told journalists that he would insist on retaining control of the defence ministry, even as Mr Hekmatyar was proclaiming to oust Mr Masoud as soon as he stepped into the prime ministerial slot. The DC is pivotal to the proposed scheme of power- sharing. Yet the accord doesn’t address the question of who will head it and what its exact relationship will be in relation to the cabinet. In fact, it will be a small miracle cobbling together such a supra-national body and making it work. The establishment of an “independent” election commission comprising representatives of the various factions is a contradiction in terms which will make it difficult to elect a constituent assembly in 8 months. Forging a consensus on the constitution in only six months after that is going to be even more problematic. Even a cursory glance at the accord suggests it is completely dependent on the concept of “collective responsibility” and mutual consultations for establishing the DC, the election commission and the constitution. Yet it is precisely such a collective will to share power that has been sadly lacking among the warring Afghans so far. Why there should be a sudden change of attitudes hardened during years of internecine warfare remains unanswered. The Pakistan government’s approach is also questionable. In April 1992, Mr Sharif was in such a hurry to negotiate an accord that he rushed to embrace Ahmad Shah Masoud and sidelined Mr Hekmatyar. Now he has done exactly the opposite. In fact, by pushing for an agreement which also lacks the approval of Gen Rashid Dostum, Mr Sharif may have sown the seeds of renewed conflict even before the ink has dried on the signatures. Both Dostum and Masoud know the ground realities in which might rather than right has prevailed. No power-sharing sentiment can override the legitimacy of hard-won victories or the bitterness of defeat. No, there is no “peace accord”. All the relevant questions have been brushed under the carpet by Mr Sharif in his bid to notch up another “historic achievement”. The Afghans are called upon to build a modern nation-state. But the historic formation of nation-states is hardly dependent on scraps of paper. In Afghanistan, the warring factions will most probably have to slug it out for years before, one by one, they drop dead from exhaustion or surrender to a superior warlord. In the end, a “modern prince” will have to emerge and forge national unity after crushing all resistance by force. Failing that, the country is fated to split up into de jure principalities which are vassals of more powerful neighbours.
Imran Is Done
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