The knives are out, the air is thick with portents for change in Islamabad. There are two distinct theories floating about. Both are based on two critical assumptions: (a) Mr Ishaq Khan wants another five-year term armed with the 8th amendment. (b) The Ishaq-Nawaz relationship has been irrevocably breached by the latter’s attempt to clip the Presidency’s powers and suspicions that he will hoist his own candidate as President later this year.
Theory No.1 goes like this: “Within a couple of months at most”, Mr Khan will dissolve the assemblies. He will do so sooner rather than later because, with each passing week, he becomes a lame-duck as his motives become increasingly questionable. The appointment of a new chief justice of the Supreme Court by the President in April is a crucial prerequisite to this scheme of things.
Theory No. 2: Mr Khan would prefer to manoeuver an “in-House” change for the following reasons: (1) Dissolution of three directly elected assemblies by an indirectly elected President in five years won’t look good. (ii) There’s no cast-iron guarantee that the judiciary will uphold the dissolution. This strategy will unfold as soon as (a) A deal has been done with Bhutto by Mr Khan. (b) A consensus has been established over who will be the next PM.
“Nothing of the sort will happen”, say those who believe that one of the assumptions (“irreconcilable breach of relationship between the President and PM) underlying both theories is misplaced. “A reconciliation is on the cards” because (i) Mr Khan will not risk dissolving the assemblies for fear his decision may not be upheld by the judiciary. (ii) Mr Khan will not be able to win the numbers game against a sitting PM; therefore in-House change is out. (iii) Mr Sharif will not be able to muster a two-thirds majority in both houses; therefore repealing the 8th amendment is out. Since politics is the art of the possible, therefore both protagonists will be forced to live and let live, however unhappily, ever after.
“Nonsense”, retort the President’s men, “the old man is no fool, he knows that Sharif cannot be trusted to honour any reconciliation for long. Surely, the PM will try and strike again later this year when the President is a confirmed lame-duck”. At any rate, they argue, if the PM should seek a reconciliation, the President will snub him publicly. This should erode parliamentary confidence in Mr Sharif and make him even more vulnerable to attacks within the assembly.
All these arguments and counter-arguments suggest that whatever in going to happen will happen soon, no later than “a couple of months”. How realistic is this conclusion?
A close look at these scenarios would reveal that all are crucially dependent on one major assumption: that Mr Ishaq is a candidate for re-election next November. (That’s why he and Sharif are out to get each other and it has already become a “do or die’ situation for both). But, suppose, for one moment, that President Ishaq has secretly decided that he wants an honourable and early retirement. He may have been persuaded in this regard for the following reasons: (i) He is getting on to 80 and, despite robust good health, he cannot expect to last for ever (ii) If, God forbid, he should pass away while in office, the political system would be up for grabs even before he is cold in his grave. The presidency would be stripped of all powers, Mr Sharif would become an all-powerful PM and the opposition would land up at the door of the army chief and bray for martial law. That is why, Mr Khan might think it high time to plan for an orderly succession to another era.
If Mr Khan is conscious of all this, if he knows he isn’t a candidate next December, what might conceivably be his preferred course of action? (i) He won’t be in any hurry to get on with the game. So April may come and go without any upheavals in Islamabad. (2) He will give Mr Sharif a longer rope with which to hang himself. (3) He will have no qualms about dissolving the assemblies when he thinks the time is ripe because his motives will then no longer be circumscribed by any personal considerations or ambitions. (4) Dissolution might, more realistically, be followed up by “cleaning the system”, establishing a framework for continuity (he will doubtless select the next president after consulting with the army chief), reforming the electoral laws, and disqualifying many leading politicians from playing any role in the future. In other words, if Mr Khan is not keen on another term, he has all the freedom in the world to sit back and plan meticulously for the years ahead.
President Ghulam Ishaq does not act impulsively. In fact, he rarely does what is commonly expected of him. He is no one’s man. Nor is he amenable to wheeling and dealing for short-term gains. All conspirators, high or low, would do well to recheck their assumptions.