First it was Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah. Then it was President Farooq Leghari. Now it is COAS General Jehangir Karamat. The three persons who wittingly and jointly paved the way for Nawaz Sharif’s ascent to power were all decent, law-abiding, patriotic people who had desperately hoped that Mr Sharif would provide good, democratic government, promote economic recovery and uphold the law and constitution. When Mr Sharif didn’t do any such thing, each tried to reason with the prime minister and, failing that, opted to exit from the scene. Unfortunately, however, their personal concreteness in supporting “democracy” to their bitter ends could prove misplaced in the future. The story is worth recapitulating briefly only in order to discern an outline for the future.
When Mr Sharif ordered two petty officials in Faisalabad to be arrested and handcuffed in front of PTV cameras in February 1997 and Justice Sajjad Ali Shah ordered them bailed out a couple of days later, the chief justice’s fate was sealed. Mr Sharif felt slighted and vowed to even the score. The anti-terrorist bill curtailing the writ jurisdiction of the higher courts was now proposed by the government and a running battle with the chief justice ensued. Mr Sharif was adamant on having his way. When Justice Shah tried to reason with him and offered to ensure quick justice within the parameters of the existing law, Mr Sharif spurned the offer. Then Justice Shah asked for the elevation of five high court justices to the supreme court. When Mr Sharif replied by erecting road blocks in his way, Mr Leghari offered to mediate between the prime minister and chief justice. But Mr Sharif had other ideas. Even as Mr Leghari’s was trying to cool down tempers on both sides and exploring compromise options, Mr Sharif was busy planning a “coup” in the supreme court against the chief justice. The attempted coup failed only because Justice Shah cut short a trip to Saudi Arabia in October 1997 and retaliated by reasserting his authority. From then onwards, the chief justice and the prime minister were set on a collision course. A last ditch effort for reconciliation between the two was made by Mr Leghari and COAS Jehangir Karamat in November. The COAS “bought” a week’s time from Justice Shah — who agreed to postpone a hearing of the contempt case against Mr Sharif — with a view to finding an honourable way out for both parties. But Mr Sharif exploited the pause in hostilities to launch fresh attacks on the chief justice from fellow judges in Quetta and Peshawar. Mr Sharif now asked President Leghari to oust Justice Shah via the Supreme Judicial Council. In exchange he offered him a second term as president. When Mr Leghari tried to reason with the prime minister and failed, he offered his resignation. “Find yourself another president who will sign the dismissal orders”, said Mr Leghari, “because I cannot bring myself to do so”. However, Mr Leghari stayed his resignation because General Karamat urged him not to do so. “If you resign, I will also do so”, warned General Karamat.
But it was all over the following week. The Supreme Court was stormed by Muslim League thugs trucked in from Lahore and Pindi, despite a last minute effort on the eve of the assault on the supreme court by the DG-ISI, General Naseem Rana, acting on the orders of General Karamat, to persuade the prime minister to hold his guns. “We will not do anything of the sort tomorrow”, said Mr Sharif to General Rana, and then proceeded to give the green signal to the thugs waiting in the wings. Following the assault, Justice Shah wrote to President Leghari asking for protection. Mr Leghari censured the government for failing to protect the supreme court and, in his capacity as supreme commander of the armed forces, ordered General Karamat to do the needful. General Karamat, however, referred the request to the defence ministry which promptly declined it. On December 2nd, Mr Leghari decided to resign, despite a last ditch effort by General Karamat and DG-ISI at 12 noon that day to persuade him to change his mind. Justice Shah was ousted by Senate Chairman Wasim Sajjad in his capacity as acting-president barely one hour after President Leghari’s resignation at 5 pm.
The lessons were clear enough. Justice Shah had incurred the wrath of the prime minister by trying to uphold the law. He had to go. Mr Leghari had incurred the wrath of the prime minister by upholding the constitution and refusing to fire the chief justice. He had to go. General Karamat had sided with the prime minister because he was not prepared to impose martial law in order to save democracy from itself. He stayed, if only because he thought he could thus save his institution from being sucked into the political quagmire.
During much of 1998, General Karamat delicately tried to reason with the prime minister, first over the question of his proposed new selection of a Punjabi president, then over Mr Sharif’s desire to push through the 15th constitutional amendment last February and finally over the question of governmental priorities. But Mr Sharif was in no listening mood. Much of what General Karamat said in his speech at the War College on 5th October had been already conveyed to Mr Sharif in private. In actual fact, General Karamat faced a restive and anxious audience of senior army officers at the War College. In the interests of the country and his own institution, he spoke frankly. When he took the decision to go public via the ISPR, it is inconceivable that he did not appreciate the full consequences of his action. His options were once again clear: he could impose martial law or resign. He chose to come home.
The conclusions can now be drawn. When Mr Leghari decided not to become an accessory after the fact of the murder of democracy in Pakistan by Mr Sharif and spurned the offer of a second presidential term, he had no option except to resign. When General Karamat spoke his mind and spurned the offer of a term as Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, he had no option but to resign. And if Mr Leghari’s resignation had served to put General Karamat on the spot, General Karamat’s resignation is bound to put the new army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, on an even more difficult spot in the coming months.
The business of resignations will now come to a stop. The old guard — chief justice, president, army chief — has gone to live with its conscience after throwing in the towel. A new troika is in place. Of the three, President Tarar will be lucky if he can find mention in an obscure footnote of history. Chief Justice Ajmal Mian, on the other hand, still has an opportunity to stake an honourable claim on the time of historians. Whether he chooses to do so or decides to fade away into dubious oblivion remains to be seen. General Musharraf, however, will have to choose from being a victim of fate or a man of destiny. His is an onerous task which cannot be shrugged away either by a premature retirement or an ostrich-like attitude.
The Pakistan army is restive about the virtues of democracy and insecure of its space and stake in the country. It is also trapped in the ideological legacy of the cold war and unsure of how to get out of it in one piece in the post cold-war era. There are difficult times ahead. An economic collapse followed by political anarchy will have far-reaching implications for state and society. The army, in particular, will have to contend with questions not only of worsening domestic law and order and insecurity on its eastern and western borders but also with the whole range of nuclear non-proliferation security issues linked to the American agenda for South Asia at a time of dwindling economic resources, external dependence and impending financial default. Since the prime minister has now been irrevocably confirmed as being part of the problem rather than the solution — the record speaks for itself — Pakistan’s future as a nation-state has come to depend almost exclusively on how General Musharraf and his cabinet of corps commanders attempt to grapple with such issues. It is most unfortunate that the civilians and their institutions have come to such a tragic pass. It is also ironic that the focus of our comment has come to rest on the armed forces and its leaders. But that’s how the cookie is set to crumble.