Astring of controversial political decisions by Mr Asif Zardari has brought Pakistan to a dangerous impasse. At the outset, after the PPP won the elections and was invited by President Pervez Musharraf to form a government, the logic of the two parties system demanded a strategic coalition alliance between the PPP and PMLQ as originally envisaged by Benazir Bhutto. But Ms Bhutto’s assassination was an emotionally unhinging experience. Having referred to the Q League as “Qatil” League, Mr Zardari determined to avenge her death by getting rid of President Musharraf (and seizing the Presidency for himself). For this he had to ally with the PMLN instead of the PMLQ.
The second decision, which flowed from the logic of an alliance with the PMLN to get rid of President Musharraf, was to publicly concede its demand to restore Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhry as chief justice, despite being acutely aware of the judge’s anti-PPP views. When Mr Zardari didn’t fulfill his commitment (how could he undermine his own regime?), he lost public credibility as well as his alliance with the PLMN.
Mr Nawaz Sharif’s agenda is clear. He has been out in the cold since 1999 and can’t stomach the prospect of eclipse for another four years. He desperately wants Iftikhar Chaudhry restored so that he can hold all Musharraf acts illegal, including the reprieve from corruption granted to Mr Zardari and the ban on Mr Sharif, thereby compelling an election soon. He is capitalizing on his rising nation-wide popularity in the wake of the plunging fortunes of the PPP.
Mr Zardari’s pre- emptive strike to oust the Punjab government on February 25 (how could he allow it to put its weight behind the Long March and destabilize his federal government?) has precipitated a bigger crisis. Wounded, the Sharifs have declared war. They are exhorting people to rise as a revolutionary force and overthrow the system. This is a recipe for radical change which can only come with blood on the street.
Mr Zardari has offered a constitutional formula to Mr Sharif in which his grievances are addressed satisfactorily – including a restoration of Mr Chaudhry – without endangering his regime’s longevity. But Mr Sharif refuses to bend. He wants Mr Chaudhry restored before any deal with Mr Zardari, partly because he doesn’t trust him to keep his word and partly because he thinks Mr Chaudhry will obviate the need for any constitutional amendment.
Understandably, Washington is worried. It had hoped Mr Zardari would create a political consensus against the war on terror and get the military’s backing for it. Instead, he has only succeeded in alienating large sections of public opinion. One consequence of this has been an opportunistic “peace deal” with the Taliban in Swat which has been denounced as an abject surrender of state sovereignty to terrorists. As if on cue, Mullah Umar, leader of the Taliban, has called on all Taliban groups, Pakistani and Afghan, to unite to face the American “surge” in Afghanistan instead of expending energy fighting the Pakistan army.
Will the army intervene? It has already been pricked by media criticism of the war on terror. If it seized power, it would have to face the combined opposition – Mr Sharif has warned that if the army takes over instead of easing Mr Zardari out and making way for him, he will join hands with Mr Zardari to oppose military rule. It would also have to deal directly with Washington and “do more” against the Taliban, an unpopular move. So it would prefer to operate behind the scenes to effect change rather than be upfront.
Some American analysts argue that, in the event of a coup, Washington should do business with the military. This is misplaced thinking. If the previous regime of General Musharraf, which was stable and popular until its last year, was compelled to play a double game – supporting the war on terror in exchange for US aid while providing safe havens to the Taliban and not committing the full might of the military to the war – any new junta would be doubly indisposed to do America’s bidding in the face of public hostility. It would be politically isolated, battling the terrorists, civil society and pro-democracy activists at the same time. Nor, in the presence of an aggressive anti-American and pro-democracy free media, would it be able to persuade Pakistanis of the righteousness of its cause. Finally, if urban jihadi organizations were to join hands with the pro-democracy movement, there would be mayhem on such a scale that the army would not be able to control it.
In the best case scenario, the Zardari government will be able to thwart the Long March without too many cracked bones. This could be followed by a PPP government in the Punjab in alliance with the PMLQ. Mr Zardari would then muddle along until another Long March wave threatens him. Meanwhile, he would struggle to work with Washington and deliver its agenda on the unpopular war on terror. In the worst case scenario, the army would step in and find itself in political quicksand. The only recipe is more democracy and consensus building, not less. Both Mr Zardari and Mr Sharif must pull back from the brink.