In the unfolding South Asian scenario, the United States is walking the thin line of peace diplomacy between unrepentant neighbours India and Pakistan. Both countries have been treated to a sermon on non-proliferation. But this hasn’t cut ice with India; hence it may have little, if any, impact on Pakistan. They have also been urged to abandon the idea of a limited war, respect the “sanctity” of the line of control in Kashmir, and reduce tensions so that an accidental or premeditated nuclear holocaust can be avoided at all costs. If this advice, too, is shunned by India, Pakistan is not likely to make any unilateral concessions. Thus the prospects for peace between them don’t look good at all. In the event, how will each country fare?
India and the US have signed a “vision” statement. This reminds us of the “friendship” treaty between India and the USSR signed many decades ago that served to prop up India’s military-industrial complex for nearly four decades. If this futuristic “vision” is to be shared with the sole superpower of today, it will surely blossom into something much more significant than the “friendship” with the other superpower of yesterday. In time to come, India could get the full red carpet treatment: easier access to American goods and markets and whopping foreign investments in information technology, biotechnology, environmental protection and energy development. Indeed, President Bill Clinton has gone so far as to state that Washington supports India’s quest for leadership in this region.
Pakistan, on the other hand, will not be endorsed by the US. It will be advised to trim its jehad policy, clamp down on training camps that produce international terrorists and return to representative democracy as soon as possible. A tall order, indeed. India’s refusal to sit across the table with Pakistan is no help. And the poverty of the political landscape doesn’t inspire much hope in an early revival of democracy either. In the event, a political deadlock between Islamabad and Washington would lead to an economic chill between our ministry of finance and Western donor institutions and countries. The squeeze in Pakistan would, of course, be in stark contrast to the expansive mood in India.
Beyond the short-term South Asian scenario is the broader, medium-longer term Asian perspective. There is a growing but uncertain consensus against some of Washington’s global policies. India remains a “conscientious” objector to America’s “nuclear bullying”. Iran has repeatedly expressed its willingness to join Russia and China in opposition to American global hegemony — it has chafed under Washington’s sanctions and remains determined to continue participating in the anti-Israel campaign in Lebanon. Russia and China have opposed violations of state-sovereignty in the Balkans and in North Caucasia. And China is squarely facing the American challenge in the Asia-Pacific region where it adamantly opposes Taiwan’s independence. What is Washington’s response to all this?
It is a masterpiece of flexibility in the face of growing odds. India is in the process of being “disarmed” following President Bill Clinton’s recent visit. Trade agreements galore are being signed. Some of the post-nuclear test 1998 sanctions have been lifted and others will eventually fade away too. Mrs Madeleine Albright, the US secretary of state, has now signaled an apology of sorts to Iran over “mistakes” in US foreign policy in the past, not least support to Saddam Hussain during Iraq’s war with Iran. She has also announced a partial lifting of the sanctions imposed on Iran in 1995 and is ready to open talks on unfreezing major Iranian assets in the US. It all depends on Iran, she says. Meanwhile, the Iranian president and people are in a reformist mood to liberalise and open up their country to the world. So we may expect Iran and the US to improve ties in the years to come.
While Afghanistan and Pakistan find it difficult to accept US “engagement” on terrorism and non-proliferation respectively, Iran is already half-way there. It is a signatory to both the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). It has also kept clear of regional conflicts to its east and north. It has controlled its side of the Afghan jehad sufficiently to prevent any blow-backs, stayed out of the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict even though the Azeris were fellow Shiites, and observed strict neutrality in the war in Chechnya in North Caucasia. In fact, its relations with the states of Central Asia have actually improved after the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1994, allowing it pride of place in the grand regional consensus that includes Russia, the Central Asian states and China — a consensus that opposes Pakistan as the real power behind the Taliban. It is also in Central Asia that American and Iranian interests tend to coincide as a make-weight to Russia’s influence. Finally, Iran has mended fences somewhat with the Gulf Arabs who were forced to look to Iran for cooperation after Saddam Hussain attacked them in 1990.
Clearly, none of the opponents of American “hegemony” are immune to incentives and stimulants. India, in fact, is keen to “seduce” America into punishing Pakistan. China’s whopping trade surplus with the US also tempts it to cling to America’s One-China commitment without jumping the gun in Taiwan. With Iran now disavowing isolationalism, no one except Afghanistan and perhaps Pakistan seems to hanker for this way of life.
Nations which are not alive to regional changes in the offing or which refuse to adjust to them tend to minimise their range of strategic options. Instead, the advocates of defiance wear isolationism as a badge of courage, rebuking others for being weak-kneed in the face of hostile global forces. Certainly, this is the style in Kandahar. Is this the style which appeals to the Pakistani national security establishment and its apologists? If it is, we can only conclude that it springs from an unrealistic self-assessment and is driven by a presumption of collective wrath.
Since America’s positive initiatives with India and Iran (both more or less hostile to Pakistan) will surely intensify in time to come, it is imperative that Pakistan should break out of its defiant and rejectionist mode precisely at a moment of its greatest economic vulnerability. This is urgently required in the face of Islamabad’s intense confrontation with New Delhi and growing distance from Washington. What could be better than that its greatest asset – its nuclear capability – should now allow it to embrace statesmanship safely and enable it to adjust to new regional developments with a measure of maturity and flexibility like its neighbours to the east and west.