The Pakistan government finally admitted on Wednesday 7 January that Ajmal Qasab, the Mumbai terrorist, hails from Pakistan. Unfortunately, however, the admission is marred with fumbling at the highest level which has detracted from its significance and credibility. This is what happened.
A decision was taken by the Pakistani establishment some days ago to admit Ajmal Qasab’s culpability as a Pakistani citizen. But the timing of a statement to that effect was left open for constant review. Several solid reasons were considered in support of this decision.
First, the truth about Ajmal Qasab could not be denied any longer without loss of the government’s credibility and sincerity in cracking down on home spun terrorists. In fact, elements of the independent Pakistani media had already cast the first stone against the official state of denial by unearthing Faridkot and establishing the fact that Qasab belonged to it. Second, India’s decision to up the ante – by alleging that the Pakistani “non-state” actors involved in the Mumbai carnage were actually “state” actors, followed by a return to the rhetoric of “all options are on the table”, the notching up of its international diplomacy after handing over a “dossier of evidence” to Islamabad and the international community – persuaded the Pakistani establishment to concede the connection and diffuse the pressure. Third, the imminent arrival in Islamabad of US vice president-elect Joseph Biden just days before the swearing in of the new administration in Washington was a factor in hastening the Pakistan government’s decision. Mr Biden, a straight talking man who is expected to wield diplomatic clout in the Obama administration, is the architect of the proposed US$15 billion in US financial assistance over ten years to Pakistan that is linked to Pakistan’s support in the war against terrorism. At a time when the Pakistan economy is in dire need of foreign financial injections to prop it up, international donors cannot be trifled with.
Unfortunately, a lack of communication and consultation within the establishment on January 7 has led to a sacking of the national security advisor, Gen (retd) Mahmood Ali Durrani, by Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, and muddied the waters. Gen Durrani was approached for an interview by an American and Indian channel. He thought the moment ripe to admit the Qasab connection, obtained a nod from the ISI and the presidency, and went ahead with the statement. He failed to take the PM into the loop for two reasons: first, he was one of four persons duly authorized by the PM in writing to speak on the subject; second, he assumed that touching base with the two real centres of power was sufficient. In the event, both the PM and the Foreign Office were caught off guard, and the information minister, Sherry Rehman, had to check with the presidency and signal the Foreign Office to back Gen Durrani. The PM, who had probably hoped to make the important statement himself, was so irked by lack of consultation, approval and information on the appointed day, protested to the president and sacked General Durrani to save face. Thus the national security advisor has been sacrificed at the altar of domestic politics and prestige and not for making an incorrect statement.
Of course, this reflects rather badly on the state of affairs in Islamabad. Even when a good decision is made, as in this case, the government does not know how to extract maximum advantage from it. The PM should have kept his cool and backed the national security advisor instead of making a spectacle of it. Worse, the PM’s egotistic decision has sparked speculation that perhaps the military brass is not on board. But this is not true. A recent interview by the ISI chief, General Ahmad Shuja Pasha, to a German magazine is revealing. General Pasha made five major points: first, he ruled out war between India and Pakistan as a means of resolving any dispute, now or in the future; second, he argued that terrorism and not India was the real enemy of Pakistan; third, he explained that he reported to the president and took his orders from him, as required by the amended constitution; fourth, he said that it was completely clear to the army chief and to his agency that the civilian government must succeed for the sake of Pakistan; fifth, he believed firmly in the West’s coalition with Pakistan, and was convinced that by working together, everyone would be able to defeat terror. This amounts to major vote of confidence in the government at least on one critical count.
But this does not mean that everything will be hunky-dory henceforth in Islamabad. Tensions between the president and prime minister may cross the red line. The Supreme Court could disqualify Nawaz Sharif from contesting elections and Shahbaz Sharif from holding the CM office for the third time, paving the way for a takeover by the PPP-PMLQ and provoking a PMLN-Lawyers movement on the streets. Some aggrieved non-state actors may hit back. In the final analysis, any new attack by them on India or America from Pakistani soil would unleash domestic, regional and international forces that could spin Pakistan out of control.