In recent months, India has been sliding on its historic commitment to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty which comes up for signing in 1996. Now we know why. American satellites have confirmed that something unusual is happing at Pokhran, the site of the Indian atomic explosion in 1974. This has led the world to conclude that India may be seriously thinking of testing a nuclear device before the CTBT puts a formal lid on it for all times to come.
Such fears are not unjustified. Strategic opinion in India is unanimous in arguing that India should gatecrash into the Big Powers Club. This objective can only materialise if India wins a permanent seat in the UN Security Council and is also accorded the status of a nuclear power.
The Indian bid for Great Power status is well underway. However, a nuclear test would certainly force the world to sit up and take notice of India’s grand ambitions. Since the first explosion twenty-two years ago, say Indian scientists, its nuclear programme has advanced considerably, therefore, it is time to test its achievements before signing the CTBT. And with elections due next year, a nuclear test might reverse the Congress(I)’s flagging fortunes and restore it to power.
Of course, India denies that it is preparing to test a new device. But such denials carry no weight. India has lied through its teeth before and rarely given a damn about what the world thinks. Pokhran hasn’t suddenly become the nerve centre of activity without reason.
Another explanation may equally fit the bill: India is upping the stakes so that it can blackmail the American into giving it the advanced computer technology to simulate a nuclear explosion. In other words, India may be saying: give us the technology or we will be forced to carry out a nuclear test. In the event, the likely American response can be gauged from a recent editorial in The New York Times which says: “In pressing the government of Narasimha Rao to forego a test, the United States might consider some help on Indian security issues or trade and technology transfer concerns.” Where would this leave Pakistan?
Pakistan’s nuclear programme is tied to India’s programme. We say we will sign the NPT, CTBT and Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty on the same terms and conditions as India. Does this mean that if India tests a device, we will be obliged to follow suit? And what should Pakistan do if India doesn’t test a device but succeeds in blackmailing the Americans to support its bid for Great Power status?
These are weighty questions which Pakistan cannot ignore except at great peril. The time has therefore come to review our options as boldly as possible. Foremost among these are the following: Since India continues to upgrade and accumulate fissile material, why should we retain our unilateral freeze on the production and enrichment of uranium? If India is planning to deploy ballistic missiles, why shouldn’t we unpack ours and get them ready for deployment? If India is making preparations to test a nuclear device, why shouldn’t we take the wraps off our programme and follow suit? If India goes ahead and tests a device, why shouldn’t we put our bomb on the shelf too? And if India has devised a clever strategy to blackmail the Americans into accepting its demands, why shouldn’t we be seriously thinking of constructing one too?
We might have expected the United States to learn from past experience that it doesn’t pay to lean unfairly on Pakistan. But, following the Brown amendment, the Americans are behaving as though we owe them a great favour. Don’t deploy your missiles and don’t upgrade your nuclear programme, they are warning us again, or else the sky will fall on your head. Is this position fair? Why are American warnings reserved only for Pakistan and not for India?
The US must recognise that in view of growing doubts about India’s political and nuclear motives, Pakistan cannot sit back with equanimity. In due course, powerful voices are likely to be raised in this country that we should abandon restraint in the face of a defiant India. And if the stakes are raised to such extremes, it will be difficult, it not impossible, to defend the current contours of US-Pak relations.
Washington needs, for once, to forget about Pakistan and turn the screws on India. That is where the obstacles to regional peace in South Asia originate. That is where the problems of missile and nuclear proliferation are multiplying. If American emissaries have to be sent anywhere to caution restraint, they should be sent to New Delhi and not to Islamabad.
Pakistani has always bent over backwards to be reasonable and responsible. In contrast, India has always been bloody-minded and arrogant. The new evidence at Pokhran testifies to this. Therefore, it is time Washington devised a coherent and credible non-proliferation strategy in South Asia which addresses the outstanding disputes in the region. Failing this, the world should get ready to put up with two hostile countries armed with tested nuclear weapons.